value of the land. This will be a great handicap in reconstruction and recuperation after the War.

The fundamental mistake has been that food has not been considered as a munition of war, and that the farm has not been treated as a munition factory. . . .

Had we at the outset come to terms with the farmers and told them definitely what to do, our situation to-day would have been very different.

Yours sincerely,

CHRISTOPHER TURNOR."

Yet our efforts to get this matter dealt with by the First Coalition were disregarded. It was not the fault of the Ministers of Agriculture, who did their best to draw attention to the danger and to urge strong action. Looking back on that period, one could almost imagine that a powerful junta *A defeatist junta?* within the Government had made up their minds that we could not win, and that the War must therefore be brought to an end as early as possible, and that for this reason they opposed any plans which might encourage its prolongation—failing to comprehend that an inevitable peace meant a bad peace. Maybe, however, it was just stupidity and inertia on their part. Let us give them the benefit of the doubt whichever plea is put in on their behalf.

When I formed my Administration in December, 1916, I was convinced that if this country should

endure to victory, it was essential that both branches of the food problem—production and distribution—should be tackled vigorously and without delay. I therefore regarded the food problem as one of our most important concerns. Food production was